I defend this claim that some natural essences can be known (only) a posteriori against two philosophers who accept essentialism but who hold that essences are known a priori: Joseph LaPorte, who argues from the use of kind terms in science, and E. J. Lowe, who argues from general metaphysical and epistemological principles.
Introduction
Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others have argued for a pair of related claims (i) that we can have knowledge of the essences of natural kinds, and furthermore (ii) that this knowledge is often a posteriori. Although such an opinion has had widespread acceptance, there have nonetheless been numerous philosophers who have rejected these arguments. Typically their target has been Kripke-Putnam essentialism, (i), or the externalist, referential semantics that is often taken to be related to essentialism. Thus essentialism is often opposed by those who wish to defend Kuhnian claims concerning incommensurability. But more recently there have been objections to the second of the pair of claims by philosophers who accept the truth of (i). Such philosophers are essentialists, but regard all knowledge of essences as being a priori. In this paper I shall focus on two sets of objections to the claim that 1 our knowledge of essences is often a posteriori, the first from Joseph LaPorte and the second from E. J. Lowe. 2 LaPorte: kind essences are stipulated According to LaPorte (2004) , theory change is frequently accompanied by conceptual change. Our earlier scientific concepts, natural kind concepts in particular, are vague and the relevant scientific discoveries reveal the possibility of alternative precisifications of the concept. How to modify the concept is a matter of choice.
And thus, although there are Kripke-style necessities pertaining to natural kinds, the choice of a precisification of a kind concept in effect amounts to a stipulation that fixes the relevant necessities as true. LaPorte's argument can be encapsulated in the following claims: Claims (c) and (d) together yield the result that essences are stipulated but not discovered. LaPorte does acknowledge that Kripke-style discoveries of essences could occur, but denies that they in fact do.
I shall argue principally that (d) is false, but I shall also cast some doubt on (c).
As a consequence I do not believe that LaPorte's arguments motivate any very significant departure from Kripke at all, although those arguments are nonetheless important in that they require at least a more nuanced view of the Kripkean paradigm.
3 Essences of chemical kinds
LaPorte gives a range of interesting and informative examples. Most of these are in biology but some come from chemistry. I shall start with the latter. LaPorte starts with the example of jade and argues, contrary to the tradition following Putnam, that jade presents an example very similar to his Twin Earth thought experiment, but with a different outcome. For many centuries the jade that the Chinese worked with and called 'yü' was just nephrite. Only towards the end of the eighteenth century was jadeite from Burma introduced into China. Chinese jade experts were aware that it was a different material, but nonetheless decided also to regard it as 'yü '. LaPorte (2004: 94-100) argues that the terms 'jade' and 'yü' have a certain kind of vagueness, such that it was not determinate whether the new jade, jadeite, was within the extension of those terms. A decision was made to include the new material, thus introducing a change to the concepts 'jade' and 'yü', rather than an application of previous, unchanging concepts. Furthermore, that decision went in a different direction to the direction that is alleged in the Twin Earth story. There we are supposed to reject XYZ as water despite superficial similarity. With jade the chemically different but superficially similar jadeite was included, not rejected. If LaPorte's understanding of this case is right, then the extension of 'yü' is not fully determinate, but is vague. Given that for centuries the Chinese only ever knew nephrite, one might have expected, from Putnam's Twin Earth story, that they would reject jadeite, on the grounds that is is different kind of substance. But, they eventually decided against that. LaPorte (2004: 101-2) then contrasts the cases of topaz and ruby. Topaz was initially identified by its yellow colour, but the discovery that some blue minerals have the same chemical composition led to their inclusion under the extension of 'topaz'. Ruby is also identified by its colour, this time red, but in this case the existence of blue minerals with the same underlying structure were not included within the term's extension. 1 The contrasting cases seems to suggest that it is a matter of choice whether we take the extension of a term to include newly discovered items that share some of the features of established sample but not others. It is thus a matter of choice that topaz is the mineral with formula Al 2 SiO 4 (F,OH) 2 -presumably the discovery of blue minerals with the same formula could, as in the case of ruby, have led to a restriction of 'topaz' just to the yellow variety of the mineral-and consequently the essence of topaz is a matter of stipulation.
The story here, I think, may be a little more complicated. For in the case of ruby there was already a term available for the mineral species of which ruby is a variety, viz. corundum, and furthermore, there was already an ancient name in use for blue corundum, viz. 'sapphire'. So it is not clear how much choice played a part in the case of ruby. In which case it would not offer a fair contrast to the case of topaz, which in turn may then look less like a case of choice too.
However, the real problem with the cases of jade, topaz, and ruby is that we are dealing here with gemstones and so there are interests competing here with the scientific ones. It would not be a surprise to find that when there is tension between the two that the former predominate. It is not that the scientific concept is forgotten completely but rather that some compromise is sought. And so one could take the view that jade really was just nephrite but that the makers of jade artifacts decided that it was in their interests to allow jadeite also to count as jade. refers to some substance of other; LaPorte thinks it is a matter of choice which substance the term refers to, I don't (likewise the difference between the Earth scientists and the visitors to Deuterium Earth in LaPorte's story is a difference about which substance they take 'water' to refer to). Might 'water' be used in such way that it is intended that it refers to that infimal substance kind that is most similar to actual samples of water, across the board (including biological and military behaviour)?
That would seem to pick out P 2 O rather than H 2 O. But strictly it would pick out one of seventeen kinds of P 2 O that differ in their isotope of oxygen. The problem is this.
We need an account of the semantics of 'water' that makes is a term that refers to a substance, albeit subject to a certain degree of open texture that allows it to be indeterminate which substance it refers to. But it is unclear that there is a way of making P 2 O one of the potential referents, and that is because 'P 2 O' aims to specify a substance partly in terms of an isotope (P) and partly in terms of an element (O) that is undifferentiated with respect to isotope. I am not sure that there is any way of doing that. To put the worry another way, I don't think that there really is a substance that is P 2 O-P 2 O is just a mixture of seventeen of the hundred-plus isotopic variants of 
Essences of biological kinds
LaPorte does however present cases where the appearance of conceptual choice cannot be explained by interests external to the science in question. LaPorte's discussion of biological kinds turns on quite different issues.
LaPorte first raises the case where scientists seem to have corrected earlier speakers' classifications. This looks to be fertile ground for the discovery of essences.
For example, people have long taken the set of rodents to include not only mice and rats but also guinea pigs. But investigation shows that guinea pigs are not at all closely related to mice and rats-any clade that includes mice, rats, and guinea pigs should also include horses and many other mammals. 5 So it looks as if we have discovered that guinea pigs are not rodents. Yet, says LaPorte, this is not a discovery but a stipulation or choice. For the scientists had three options as regards the rodent grouping:
(a) reduce the class so as to exclude guinea pigs;
(b) expand the class so as to include the other mammals sharing the same clades as both guinea pigs and the other traditional rodents;
(c) dispose of 'rodent' as a cladistically respectable term so as to retain its existing extension (both guinea pigs and other traditional rodents but not horses, primates etc.).
According to LaPorte, the fact that we ended up with (a) represents a choice on the part of the scientists. Expanding the grouping, (b), even dramatically, is not unprecedented-it is now common to hear that the dinosaurs did not go extinct but live on in the form of birds. As for (c), 'reptile', is a term that has been abandoned in cladistics but retained in the vernacular.
The relevant work on guinea pigs was carried out in the 1990s. Interestingly, the debates took place under the headline 'Is the guinea pig a rodent?', 6 and there seems an underlying presumption, on both sides of the still-continuing scientific debate, that if the science showed that guinea pigs have an ancestry that branches from the other mammals before primates and other traditional rodents, then guinea pigs would not be rodents. So there seems to be near universal agreement that (a)
would be right. Nonetheless, there is some remaining tendency to say things such as 'rodents are not monophyletic' which would indicate a usage conforming to (c).
5 A clade is a class of organisms that includes an ancestral organism plus all (and only) its descendants. As John Dupré has pointed out, the cladistics-based essentialism under discussion will not work for micro-organisms since they experience a considerable degree of lateral gene transfer. Arguably this undermines cladistics for high organisms too, because they are dependent on the micro-organisms that make up the bulk of their body mass and which are also congenitally inherited. 6 Cf. Graur et al. (1991); Li et al. (1992); Cao et al. (1994); D'Erchia et al. (1996) ; Sullivan and Swofford (1997) .
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But this may be just a hangover from previous habits-it was clear that the order Rodentia was held to be monophyletic. No hint of (b) as a possibility was given.
Here is a proposal as regards the use of names for higher taxa, in the face of apparent changes to extension:
(i) the taxon should be a clade;
(ii) a clear majority of subtaxa regarded as paradigmatic of the taxon should be included in the taxon;
(iii) a clear majority of subtaxa regarded as typical foils for the taxon should be excluded from the taxon.
7
If it is not possible to meet these requirements, the name is held not to name a taxon.
The idea behind (TAX) is that while we classify things under conditions of imperfect knowledge, we aim to do so in such a way that out taxonomic groupings are natural-in this case, so that they are clades. But because of our partial ignorance, we may in fact fail to achieve this. In the light of further information we are willing to correct our previous classifications. But how should we do so? We do so in such a way that, if possible, our new classification is natural (a clade) and that as many of our previous classifications as possible are maintained as correct. But not all previous classifications are equal-some are especially paradigmatic, and some function as typical foils. These prior classifications are the ones we are most interested in preserving. Another way of looking at (TAX) is that it says that a classificatory term designates that clade which best satisfies our existing classifications, at least the privileged ones. But if there is no reasonably nearby best satisfier, then the term is does not designate a clade at all, but is not a non-natural kind term.
7 For the classic paradigm and foil account of kind extension see Quine (1969) . Unlike Quine I am not suggesting that our paradigms and foils are definitive of the kind. Rather they represent our best guess at a kind in the absence of full scientific information.
(TAX) would explain the data that LaPorte presents. 8 As regards rodents, if Dan
Graur and his colleagues are right, then (TAX) would tell us to exclude guinea pigs, since that keeps rodents as a clade, excludes only one family of putative typical rodents (the guinea pigs-an even these are not especially typical). The idea that we could extend the taxon to include pretty well all mammals would fail thanks to (iii).
Turning to dinosaurs, the inclusion of modern birds does not extend the apparent extension of 'dinosaur' to include enough foils to contravene (iii). Indeed I do not think that modern birds are a foil at all for the dinosaurs, since the typical dinosaurs are mesozoic animals and so the principal foils are mesozoic as well-that is, the triassic crocodilia and the thecodonts.
The case of reptiles is different, since their typical representatives are living rather than dead creatures. For reptiles the obvious foils are living mammals and living birds. But for reptiles to be monophyletic, they should include the birds also.
Doing so would contravene (iii). On the other hand, excluding birds would require also excluding lizards, snakes, turtles, and tortoises, contravening (ii). So 'reptile' looks like a good candidate for exclusion from scientific taxonomy.
I would not wish to suggest that (TAX) should be part of anyone's best theory of taxonomy. Rather, I am suggesting that it is a reasonable hypothesis that is not excluded by LaPorte's data, nor by any argument he gives. Consequently, we cannot conclude with any degree of confidence that the outcomes in these cases are to be construed as choices that could have gone another way, as opposed to requirements of the way taxonomy works.
LaPorte continues his case against the discovery of essences with a discussion of the species problem and similar problems for higher taxa. As regards the species problem, LaPorte point out, first, that the different species concepts define quite different sets of species, and, secondly, even where the different species concepts agree, the difference between the concepts means that antecedently to the choice of a specific concept, we cannot be in a position to have knowledge of essences. I shall not dwell on these points, which though well-taken, do not seem to me to be especially problematic. One can be ignorant of what exactly constitutes essence while nonetheless knowing certain essential facts, and one can know such facts about a particular species so long as it is a species on any plausible species concept. The most obvious way to generate such cases is to take negations of species identity statements: the Ceylon Spiny Mouse (Mus fernandoni) is not the African Pygmy
Mouse (Mus minutoides).
The problem of higher taxa arises because the boundaries of a taxon may not be clear. LaPorte gives the example of the giant panda: is it or is it not a bear? The latest common ancestor of the paradigm bears is just a little later than the latest common ancestor of the paradigm bears plus the panda. Both groups form clades.
Which is the bear clade? According to LaPorte there was no fact of the matter at the time the panda was first encountered by Europeans. This argument shows at most that the agreement that a certain boundary species falls within the clade constitutes a concept-changing stipulation. It does not show that every assignment of a species to a clade is stiplulative. Even if we were to concede to LaPorte's argument, it remains the case that many other statements concerning clade membership are unaffected by this vagueness and can only be understood as discoveries rather than stipulations.
It is important to recollect that LaPorte is not attacking biological essentialism.
On the contrary he defends essentialism, maintaining that biological kinds have historical essences of the kind Kripke (1980: 110-13) and McGinn (1976) given the paradigm bears, the rare Tibetan blue bear, first classified in 1854, has to be classified as a bear if the paradigm bears form a clade, however narrow or broad or vague the boundaries of that clade are.
LaPorte holds that 'the clade that stems from the ancestral group G' is a rigid designator. I think he is right. If so, then so are 'the smallest clade to which both species A and species B belong' and 'the clade descended from the common ancestor of organisms X and Y '. In that case we can have informative necessary identities that are revealed empirically. A statement of clade identity (CI) of the following form (CI) the smallest clade to which both species A and species B belong = the smallest clade to which both species C and species D belong could determine kind membership-or more precisely kind non-membership by investigating internal structure, e.g. that a tiger-like reptile is not a tiger, and likewise for a cat-like automaton (Kripke 1980: 120-2) . But that does not imply that true tigers and true cats have microstructural essences.
will be a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood, but one which will typically be known only as a result of a scientific investigation, and likewise for other groups or organisms that might substitute for A, B, C, and D. For example 'the smallest clade to which both gerbils and Delany's mouse belong = the smallest clade to which both spiny mice and Malagasy rats belong' is a necessary truth the can only be established using techniques involving nuclear and mitochondrial DNA. the inclusion of a newly discovered species within a clade, when that species falls between existing paradigm cases; non-identity claims between species; true claims of the form 'the smallest clade to which both species A and species B belong = the smallest clade to which both species C and species D belong'.
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Lowe: essence precedes existence
LaPorte's resistance to a posteriori essences is founded on claims concerning actual taxonomic practice in science, whereas E. J. Lowe (2008) bases his argument on the metaphysical principle that essence precedes existence. This principle has an ontological aspect and an epistemological aspect. It is the latter that concerns us. Lowe says that in general we can know the essence of something antecedently to knowing whether is exists. One might take this claim as saying that for everything it is possible to know its essence without knowing whether it exists. That might seem a little strong, in that one might doubt whether it is true of every thing that we can know its essence at all. But the qualifier 'in general' may be supposed to exclude such extreme cases, restricting our attention to those things whose essences we can know;
for them, we can know their essence without knowing of their existence. In my view we come to know the essence of water by investigating samples of water. But water could be like synthetic compounds who natures were known before chemists attempted to synthesize them, or like synthetic transuranic elements whose essences were known before any samples were created. However, as Lowe himself points out, our knowledge of the essences of those elements is founded on the knowledge of the existence of other things, protons, neutrons, and so forth. But if that is the case it looks as if it would not be possible to know of the essences of all kinds without knowing of the existence of their instances. 10 Conceivably, one might come to know of the essence of protons thanks to knowing of the existence of some other subatomic entity (quarks, perhaps). But it looks as if this process will have to stop with some kind whose essence we do not know before we know of its existence.
11
Lowe in fact seems to have something stronger in mind than the interpretation given above. For he defends the principle by saying that "Otherwise . . . we could never find out that something exists. For how could we find out that something, X, exists before knowing what X is-before knowing, that is, what it is whose existence we have supposedly discovered?" 12 This defence of the principle suggests that knowledge of essence is necessary for knowledge of existence to be possible, that is one must know something's essence before we know its existence. Lowe does concede that it is conceivable that God's essence does not precedes his existence; but
Lowe's choice of such an esoteric case reinforces the interpretation that he thinks that for all ordinary things, such as natural kinds, knowledge of their essence is not preceded by knowledge of their existence.
If
Lowe is right, then we cannot come to know the essence of a natural kind by a posteriori investigation of its instances. For that would be a case of knowing the existence of the kind before knowing its essence. Accordingly, Lowe resists the Kripkean arguments for a posteriori knowledge of essences. In particular, therefore, since water was known before it was known that samples of water are constituted by H 2 O, it cannot be that being constituted by H 2 O is any part of the essence of water.
Lowe agrees with Nathan Salmon (1982) that substantive knowledge of essences cannot be gained from semantic, conceptual, and empirical knowledge alone, that the semantic arguments presented for modally significant arguments, if they are valid, must contain modally charged premises or rely on unstated modal assumptions. Thus Lowe maintains that if the form of the assertion 'water is H 2 O' is understood as an analogue to 'Hesperus is Phosophorus' (i.e. as two rigid designators flanking the identity sign), then the former is a triviality (like the latter). I agree with Lowe and Salmon that the Kripke-Putnam arguments do deliver their conclusions amount to a reductive account of kinds, whereas Lowe takes natural kinds to be a fundamental ontological category in his four category ontology. Secondly, Lowe regards laws themselves as employing kinds. 12 Lowe (2008: 40) . This principle is reminiscent of the Socratic contention that in order to have knowledge of something one must be able to define it.
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by appeal to modal intuitions. That appeal is sometimes tacit, but not always. Many of Kripke's arguments make no use of semantic machinery at all and are clearly to be understood as appeals to metaphysical intuition. Kripke's arguments concerning the essentiality of origin exemplify this, as do his arguments concerning tigers, gold, and other kinds. Consequently I think it is misleading to think of the arguments for the necessity of theoretical identities as proceeding along the lines of arguments for the necessity of 'Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain'. What those arguments really establish is that the relevant alleged essence is (necessarily) necessary and sufficient for instantiation of the kind. Furthermore the two components, necessary conditions and sufficient conditions, can be decoupled, so that one may regard the arguments as establishing partial essences, that is (necessarily) necessary conditions for kind membership, even if they do not establish (necessarily) sufficient conditions. To il- Let us return then to Lowe's key contention, that unless we suppose that there are essences and that we know about them, we cannot "talk or think comprehendingly about things at all". Lowe (2008: 35-6) gives an example, "How, for instance, whether it refers to a kind at all). This decision is made in the light of knowledge of candidate essences, and so knowledge of actual essence, the one chosen, is a priori.
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that in order to know that something is a genuine and unique kind or substance one must know its essence.
But as the discussion of particulars shows, we can know that something (e.g. Tom)
is a genuine particular without knowing much about its essence at all. The same is true for kinds. Kind essences include facts that differentiate kinds from one another.
But many kinds are such that we cannot have this knowledge a priori. On the other hand, there are features that do allow us to distinguish kinds, but these facts may very well not be essential. So we can distinguish and identify genuine kinds and substances without knowledge of the relevant essences.
Above, in section 3, I mentioned the many transition elements discovered during the nineteenth century. At that time facts about atomic structure were unknown.
Chemists were nonetheless able to distinguish the different elements, using properties such as relative atomic mass and physical characteristics such as melting point.
But those properties cannot be regarded as constituting essences. For example, the relative atomic mass of an element cannot be essential to it, since it is a mean of the atomic masses of the isotopes of the element, weighted by their relative abundance on Earth. But those relative abundances can be highly contingent. Melting point fares little better: it too is, strictly speaking, dependent on isotope abundance; more pertinently, different allotropes of an element will have different melting points. So one can have good empirical grounds, as nineteenth century chemists did, for think-ing that one has discovered two distinct elements, X and Y, but those grounds supply only a non-essential basis for distinguishing X and Y. Hence, on the assumption that kinds essences do distinguish kinds, it follows that there are facts about the essences of X and Y that remain to be discovered by a posteriori means. If there are kind essences, it is the case that these essences, including essences that distinguish between kinds, are often discovered a posteriori and, in particular, after knowledge that the kind exists and is a kind.
Is there derived a posteriori knowledge of essences?
Given that Lowe's requirement for a priori knowledge is relatively thin and general, leaving considerable space for potentially a posteriori knowledge of essences, one might think that Lowe should concede that there is a posteriori knowledge of kind essences, but claim that this is derived from non-modal empirical knowledge plus a priori knowledge of essences. Thus Lowe can still claim that knowledge of essences is fundamentally a priori.
Certainly, the idea of a posteriori knowledge of truths that are necessary should be familiar by now. Consider the proposition p∨q where p is some abstruse mathematical claim ('Liouville's theorem is true') and q is some obvious empirical claim ('grass is green'). For many people p∨q is known empirically even though it is necessary. Now consider the following argument: This suggests that a posteriori knowledge of essential truths can be factorized into a priori knowledge of an essentially true premise plus a posteriori knowledge of a modally innocent premise. 13 Nonetheless, Lowe (2007) wants to resist even this.
Lowe's argument is that we do not have a worked-out logic of essence that permits us to see whether the inference from (a ) and (b) to (c ) is valid. The fact that orthodox modal logic tells us that the argument is valid is no help for two reasons. First, as Fine (1994) reminds us, what is entailed by an essential truth many not be an essential truth although it will be a necessary truth-a worked-out logic of essence would be restricted in comparison to modal logic, and so the validity of the corresponding modal inference does not imply the validity of the argument framed in terms of essence. Secondly, Lowe does not believe that we should be so quick to endorse orthodox modal logic in any case, since the orthodoxy is informed by a possible-worlds model of modality, which is antithetical to the view that "represents necessary truths as being grounded in truths about essence".
I find neither of these reasons for resisting the inference compelling. It is certainly true that we should not endorse an inference concerning essences just because the corresponding modal inference is valid. Although necessarily everything is such that Fermat's last theorem is true, the truth of Fermat's last theorem is not part of the essence of every object. That much is clear because essential truths concern the nature or identity of things, and the truth of Fermat's last theorem does not concern the nature or identity of most things. But when we turn to (c), there is no reason to suppose that it does not express an essential truth, for it does concern the nature and identity of thallium. While we would expect a worked-out logic of essence to reject inferences with conclusions such as 'thallium is essentially such that Fermat's last theorem is true' we would not expect that logic to exclude inferences with the conclusion 'thallium is essentially such that its samples are com- where Kx ≡ x is a sample of thallium, m(x) is a function from
x to x's chemically relevant microstructure, and a is the microstructure that is a matter of being composed of atoms with atomic number 81.
But this argument does not rest upon principles of modal logic that are validated only by appeal to possible worlds semantics or which may be invalidated by some satisfactory future logic of essence. The reference to natural language suggests that he has in mind 'Water = H 2 O' as a paradigm, where a vernacular kind is identified with a scientific kind, where the latter articulates the essence of the former. Even if this may be the impression that Kripke gives, essentialist truths go well beyond propositions of that form. Essentialist claims need not involve vernacular terms ('water') or scientific terms that are precisifications of such terms ('mammalia') at all. It is possible to introduce a kind term with a high degree of confidence that it does indeed name some kind but in 14 The arguments of this and the preceding paragraph are articulated in more detail in Bird 2008. 27 ignorance of what the underlying kind essence is. The elements discovered in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provide an example of this. Chemists were confident that they had identified new elements, but only in 1869 could they have begun to understand the essences of those elements, and that understanding could not have been completed until circa 1913-18.
Much of LaPorte's argument rests on the vagueness of kind terms. But the possibility that when we move from vague concept to a more precise replacement, we stipulate rather than discover what belongs to the kind, can only ever affect the status of boundary cases. But not all cases are boundary cases. Some kinds fall clearly within higher taxa and some clearly outside. Those cases, such as the fact that the Tibetan blue bear is a bear but the koala is not, are genuine discoveries of essential facts. Cladistics in fact permits the removal of much vagueness: 'bear' might be vague, but 'the smallest clade to which brown bears and pandas belong' is much less so. There may be some residual vagueness still, but that won't affect identities of the form of (CI) given above.
Lowe's argument for a priori essences comes from a different source-a requirement for comprehending thought. My conclusion is similar, that the argument establishes at most that some essential truths must be knowable a priori. 
